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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
NEWEL

J.

OLSON, operating under

the assumed name of NE\VEL

J.

OLSON & SONS;

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 7175
YS.

ROLAND A. REESE,
Defendant and Respond2nt.

Petition for Rehearing
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH:
( ·omes now the defendant in the above entitled cause
and moves this Court to grant a rehearing of the above
entitled cause upon the following grounds
l. That the Court erred in its opinion heretofore written

in holding that the trial court erred in sustaining the general
demurrer and di~mio::c:ing the case :1nd in reversing the judgment
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of dismissal and the order sustaining the demurrer and in
remanding the cause for a new trial and in permitting the
parties to amend their pleadings.
2. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court

erred in not permitting the plaintiff to amend his pleadings
for the reason that the plaintiff never requested leave to amend
and this in the face of the fact that the trial court specifically
pointed out to him during the trial wherein his complaint
failed to state a cause of action, particularly advising him the
necessary allegation it should have contained, and this notwithstanding plaintiff had a period of forty days in which to
do so. These facts the Court apparently overlooked in arriving
at its decision.
3. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court
erred for doing something the complaining party never asked
it to do, and for something which the complaining party never
himself attempted to 'remedy, that is a request for leave to
amend his pleadings.
4. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court
erred in refusing to admit the introduction of evidence after
it became known that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause
of action.
5. That the Court erred in holding that the trial court
erred in refusing to permit the plaintiff time in which to
present authorities on the question of the general demurrer
in view of the fact that the trial court itself had specifically
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pointed out \vherein the plaintiff had failed to state a cause
of action.
6. That the Court erred in assuming that the trial Court
was so firm in his conviction that plaintiff could not state a
cause of action or prove a case under any circumstances, and
tlut it would have been futile for him to have requested any

other or further consideration.
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that a rehearing

be granted, that the errors above mentioner be corrected, and
that the order of this court reversing the judgment of dismissal
of the lower court be vacated and withdrawn.
Respectfully submitted,
NEWEL G. DAINES
L. DELOS DAINES
Atto1'neys for Defendant and Respondent.

L. DELOS DAINES hereby certifies that -he is one of the ,

attorneys for the defendant and respondent in the-- above
entitled cause; that in his opinion there is merit to the alleged
errors in the majority opinion heretofore written in the above
entitled cause.
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ARGUMENT
We are mindful that in the great majority of cases after the
Court has considered the cause, no useful purpose can be
accomplished by reargument of matters decided by the Court.
However, in this- case we believe that as the Court apparently
overlooked the following facts in arriving at its decision, that
the Court will welcome a reconsideration thereof. The facts
are these:
That no_~wit?standing the trial court pointed out to the
plaintiff partiq1~arly wherein his complaint was fatally defective, he neverthe!ess during the trial or during the period
elapsing between the oral order of dismissal and the formal
entry of the judgment, failed to request or ask leave of the
Court to amend his pleadings. A period of forty days expired
between the date of the oral order of dismissal and the
-formal entry of the judgment. (Tr. 38A and 43). Furthermore, the plaintiff became aware prior to his appeal that
the formal entry of judgment had not been entered, for after'he
had served a notice of appeal on the 22nd day of March,
1948, (Tr. 38C) he abandoned the appeal and then served
a notice of appeal on the 30th day of March, 1948, the notice
_ upon which this appeal is based, after the Court had entered
iti judgment on the_ same day._ (Tr. 38.A and 38D).
During the trial, the Court said:

·' * * * _On this point the Court will-_ sustain the de·
murrer that has been filed upon the grounds and for
the reason that as _a condition precedent to the bringing
of an· action, ot to the stating of a ·canse of action, that
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the plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he was
at the time of the undertaking a licensed contr~ctor in
the State of Utah and that the proof must .show that
allegation. I hate this matter to go off on a demurrer.''
(Tr. 89).
Then in view of the fact that the plaintiff knew wherein
his complaint was fatally defective, as the Court had so advised
him, why is he now in a position to complain of his failure
to take steps to amend his complaint, which he could have
done either at the time of the trial or within the period
expiring between the oral date of dismissal and the formal
entry of judgment upon leave of the Court. Theie is no
reason to believe the Court would not have granted such a
request.
The record further discloses that the trial court granted
the plaintiff every reasonable consideration and request made.
It allowed him to amend his complaint, (Tr. 43 and 44), and
it granted his motion to vacate the order of .dismissal which
was made when plaintiff failed to appear and prosecute his
cause at its prior setting on June 6, 1948. (Tr. 30 and 38).
Furthermore, we believe that in the light of the prior
considerations granted the plaintiff that the Court would have
granted him leave to amend his pleadings to state a cause
of action on request as the Court has befo~e- stated -said: .. 1
hate thfs matter to go off on a demurrer." Especially, had
plaintiff taken the tim:e, the effort .and the •consideration to
advise the trial court that he could state a ·cause of action,
inenti~ned by the
pointing out to him that the authorities
Court in its opinion are practically unari.imoiis to the effect

as
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that the true date of the execution and delivery of the contract,
regardless of the fact that it differs from the date shown in
the contract, may be shown by parol evidence, and had given
the Court the benefit of the citations mentioned in the Court's
opinion. Plaintiff owed the Court this consideration. He had
forty days in which to do so.
Again we can see no error m the Court refusing to
proceed with the trial and admitting the introduction of further
testimony after it became apparent to the Court that plaintiff
had failed to state ·a cause of action or to grant him time in
which to present authorities on the question of the general
demurrer; fo(is not the stating of a cause of action necessary
to the Court's jurisdiction of the subject matter? And then
ther~ would be no reason for the plaintiff to present authorities
on.. the question of the general demurrer as the Court had
-pointed out to him wherein his complaint was particularly
defective and advised him as to what allegation was necessary
to cure it.
AUTHORITIES
· That the plaintiff could have requested leave to amend
.his pleadings iri time before the entry of the formal judgment
is apparent from the decisio~s of this Court. ·In the case of
Hancock vs. Luke, .148 P. 456, in an opinion written by Justice
Frick, the Court said:
·t, t * Certainly no judgment had been formally
rendered at the time, and of course none could have
been. entered, as the· colloquy between the Court and
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counsel shows. Why, then, was the offer to amend
not timely? In case pleadings are assailed, must a
party move to amend before he is apprised of what the
ruling of the court will be? We think not. We are
of the opinion, therefore, that the motion for leave
to amend was timely. * * * * "
That it is not error to stop a case and dismiss the action
where no request to amend the pleadings is made notwithstanding a cause of action might have been alleged is the
holding of the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Stewart
vs. Phoenix National Bank, 64 P. 2d 108. The court said:

" * * * Since it appears that the complaint did not
state a cause of action, the trial court, when it became
convinced of that fact, was justified in stopping ·the
trial at any stage of the case. It is true that, had plaintiff
at this time asked leave to amend his complaint, it
would have been reversible error to refuse to grant
such leave, but apparently there was no request therefor. We can surmise from the pleadings that perhaps
a cause of action might have been stated which, if
proved by plaintiff's evidence to the satisfaction of
the triers of fact, would have sustained a judgment in
his favor, but we are bound by the rules of law, and
must apply them to the record before us, and not to the
record as it might have existed. Since the complaint,
taken into consideration with the record of the mortgage foreclosure suit, of which the court properly took
judicial notice, did not state a cause of action, and
since there was no request for leave to amend it,
judgment was correctly rendered in favor of defendant"
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The California Court m the case of Watts vs. Currie,
101 P. 2d 764, said:

" * * * If the facts warranted, the complaint doubtless
could have been amended so as to obtain the benefit
of the extension of time afforded by the Moratorium
Act. But no claim is made by appellants that they
asked or made any attempt to amend after the court
ruled on the demurrer; and the law was well settled
at the time this action was pending that where a
defective complaint could be cured by amendment,
the fact that the demurrer was sustained without leave
to amend does not constitute reversible error in the
absence of a request or application by aplaintiff for such
permission. Haddad v. McDowell, 213 Cal. 690, 3
P.2d 550."
To the same effect is the Supreme Court of Idaho, for
in the case of Durant vs. Snyder, 151 P. 2d 776, the Court
said:
"It is necessary that proper showing be made and that
the application is made within a reasonable time before
denial of the application for amendment becomes an
abuse of discretion * * *"
To the same effect, also, see:
Meyer vs. Board of Public Works of City of Los
Angeles, et. al, 125 P. 2d. 50; Gomes vs. Warn
al,
91 P. 2d. 214; Vilardo vs. Sacramento County, 129 P.
2d. 165.

et.
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WHEREFORE, it is submitted that a rehearing should
be granted, that the errors herein complained of be corrected,
and that the order of this Court reversing the judgment of
dismissal and remanding the cause for a new trial be vacated
and set aside, and the judgment of the lower court be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
NEWEL G. DAINES
L. DELOS DAINES

Attot·neys for Defendant and Respondent.
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